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Abstract
Many real-world networks display a community structure. We study two random graph
models that create a network with similar community structure as a given network. One model
preserves the exact community structure of the original network, while the other model only
preserves the set of communities and the vertex degrees. These models show that community
structure is an important determinant of the behavior of percolation processes on networks,
such as information diffusion or virus spreading: the community structure can both enforce
as well as inhibit diffusion processes. Our models further show that it is the mesoscopic set
of communities that matters. The exact internal structures of communities barely influence
the behavior of percolation processes across networks. This insensitivity is likely due to the
relative denseness of the communities.
Introduction
Many complex systems across the sciences can be modeled as networks of vertices joined in pairs
by edges. Examples include the internet and the world-wide web, biological networks, food webs,
the brain, neural networks, communication and transport networks, and social networks. This
has spurred a tremendous interest in developing mathematical models that can capture universal
network properties. Moreover, with network data describing network topologies, properties derived
from models can be tested against real-world networks.
The behavior of dynamic processes such as percolation or epidemic models on those networks
are of significant interest, since for example they model the spreading of information or a virus
across a network [1, 2, 3, 4]. Understanding models for percolation may enhance insight in how an
epidemic can be stopped by immunization, or how a message can go viral by choosing the right
initial infectives. An important question is how the structure of the network affects the dynamics
of the epidemic [5]. A vast amount of research focuses on scale-free networks that possess a power-
law degree distribution [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], so that the probability pk that a vertex has k neighbors
scales with k as pk ∼ ck−τ for some constant c and characteristic exponent τ > 1. The power-law
distribution leads to scale-free behavior such as short distances due to the likely presence of hubs
or high-degree vertices. The characteristic exponent τ was also found to play a central role in
various percolation processes [11, 12, 13, 14, ?]. Other authors have focused on the influence of
clustering on the spread of epidemics [15, 16, 17, 18, 19].
Real-world networks, however, are not completely characterized by their microscopic and
macroscopic properties. Many real-world networks display a community structure [20], where
groups of vertices are densely connected, while edges between different groups are more scarce.
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Since communities are small compared to the entire network, but seem to scale with the network
size, they are typically of mesoscopic scale [21, 22]. The problem of detecting the community struc-
ture of a network has received a lot of attention [21, 23]. The exact way in which communities
influence the properties of a network is a different problem. For example, the community struc-
ture of a network influences the way a cooperation process behaves on real-world networks [24],
and using community structure improves the prediction of which messages will go viral across a
network [25]. Several stylized random graph models with a community structure have shown that
communities influence the process of an epidemic across a network [26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33],
but the extent to which community structure affects epidemics on real-world networks is largely
unexplained. Our main goal is to enhance our understanding of the intricate relation between
community structures and the spread of epidemics, and in particular to identify the properties of
community structures that have the largest influence.
We study two random graph models that generate networks with a similar community structure
as any given network. We find that these models capture the behavior of epidemics or percolation
on real-world networks accurately, and that the mesoscopic community structure is vital for un-
derstanding epidemic spreading. We find that the sets of communities are of crucial importance,
while quite surprisingly, the precise structure of the intra-community connections hardly influences
the percolation process. Furthermore, we find that community structure can both enforce as well
as inhibit percolation.
Models
We now introduce two random graph models in detail. For a given real-world network, both models
randomize the edges of the network, while keeping large parts of the community imprint. Suppose
that we are given the set of communities of a particular real-world network. Then the first model,
the hierarchical configuration model (HCM), keeps all edges inside the communities [34, 35], while
rewiring the inter-community edges. Indeed, all inter-community edges are replaced by two half-
edges, one at each end of an inter-community edge. Then, one by one, these half-edges are paired
at random. Thus, in HCM, the precise community structure of the network is the same as in the
original network, but the inter-community connections are random. The second model (HCM*),
introduced as the modular random graph in [36], replaces both the inter-community edges and the
intra-community edges by pairs of half-edges. Then again, the half-edges are paired at random.
An additional constraint is that all inter-community half-edges must be paired to one another, and
all half-edges corresponding to the same community must be paired to one another (see Figure 1
and Supplementary Note 3). Thus, a network generated by HCM* is completely random, except
for the set of communities and the degree distributions inside and outside the communities.
HCM and HCM* are extensions of the configuration model (CM), a random graph with a given
degree distribution. The CM has received enormous attention in the network literature, due to the
combination of its simplicity and its flexibility in choosing an appropriate degree structure [37, 38].
CM only preserves the microscopic degree distribution of the real-world networks, while HCM*
also preserves the mesoscopic community structure. HCM instead, preserves the entire community
structure. Supplementary Table 3 shows that indeed most of the community structures of the
original networks and the networks generated by HCM and HCM* are similar. Therefore, if we
sort the random graph models in decreasing randomness, we first have CM, then HCM*, and
then HCM. When comparing the behavior of an epidemic process on these random graphs to
the original network, we see how much of the behavior of epidemics on real-world networks can
be explained by its degree distribution (CM), its rough community structure (HCM*), and by
the exact community shapes (HCM). The aim of this paper is to investigate to which extent
microscopic and mesoscopic network properties determine the spread of epidemics.
The fixed community shapes combined with the randomized inter-community connections make
HCM analytically tractable [34]. However, keeping all intra-community edges fixed makes HCM
prone to overfitting. HCM* does not have this problem and is more suitable to generate a ran-
dom network with a community structure, since all edges within communities are randomized.
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Figure 1: HCM and HCM* illustrated. a) A network with 3 communities. b) HCM ran-
domizes the edges between different communities. c) HCM* also randomizes the edges inside the
communities.
N 〈s〉 smax δnetw δcom δwcom
AS 11,174 21 910 3.75 ·10−4 0.38 0.10
Enron 36,692 15 1,722 2.73 ·10−4 0.73 0.22
HEP 9,877 10 181 5.33 ·10−4 0.59 0.32
PGP 10,680 12 160 4.26 ·10−4 0.41 0.24
FB 63,731 29 2,247 4.02 ·10−4 0.41 0.14
yeast 2,361 9 97 2.57 ·10−3 0.55 0.25
Table 1: Statistics of the data sets. N is the number of vertices in the network, 〈s〉 the average
community size, smax the maximal community size. The denseness of the network δnetw is defined
as the number of edges divided by the number of edges in a complete graph of the same size.
δcom equals the average denseness of the communities, and δ
w
com the average denseness of the
communities weighted by their sizes (See Supplementary Note 1 for more information about these
statistics).
Randomizing the intra-community edges makes HCM* harder to analyze analytically than HCM.
Some analytical results of HCM, however, can be extended to results of HCM* (Supplementary
Note 3).
Results
We analyze six different real-world networks: the internet on the Autonomous Systems level [39],
an email network of the company Enron [40, 39], the PGP web of trust [41], a collaboration network
in High energy physics, extracted from the arXiv [39], a Facebook friendship network [42] and
an interaction network between proteins in yeast [43]. Table 1 shows several statistics of these
data sets and their community structures. We extract the communities of these networks with
the Infomap community detection algorithm [44], and use these communities as input for the
HCM and HCM* model, to create networks with a similar community structure as the original
networks. Table 1 shows that the communities are of mesoscopic size: while the communities are
small compared to the entire network, and have a small expected size, all networks still contain a
few large communities.
An important property of a network is its connectedness, expressed by the fraction of vertices
in the largest component. For HCM, the size of the largest component can be derived analytically
(Supplementary Note 3). This size is independent of the precise community shapes, and therefore
is the same for HCM and HCM*, as long as the communities of HCM* remain connected. Sup-
plementary Note 3.3 shows that most HCM* communities indeed remain connected. The size of
the largest component of real-world networks can be well predicted using the analytical estimates
of HCM, which only uses the joint distribution of community sizes and the number of edges going
out of the communities (Table 2). These estimates yield a considerable improvement compared to
CM, which is generally a few percent off.
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S (data) S (HCM) S (HCM*) S (CM)
AS 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.960
Enron 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.990
HEP 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.990
PGP 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.960
FB 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.999
yeast 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.948
Table 2: The size S of the giant component in the data sets compared to the analytical estimates
of HCM and CM.
The long-term properties of an epidemic outbreak can be mapped into a suitable bond perco-
lation problem. In this framework, the probability p that a link exists is related to the probability
of transmission of the disease from an infected vertex to a connected susceptible vertex. The latter
corresponds to removing edges in a network with probability 1 − p and keeping the edges with
probability p independently across edges (other types of epidemics are discussed in Supplementary
Note 4). A quantity of interest is the size of the largest component as a function of p, which can
be described analytically for HCM [34]. However, this size depends on the community shapes, and
therefore bond percolation on HCM does not necessarily give the same results as percolation on
HCM*. Inspired by the insensitivity of the giant component to the exact community shapes, we
establish whether the community shapes significantly influence the size of the giant percolating
cluster by simulation, by showing how bond percolation affects the connectivity of the original
networks, compared to CM, HCM and HCM* (Figure 2).
We see that the behavior of the real-world networks under bond percolation is captured accu-
rately by both HCM and HCM*, in contrast to CM. In Supplementary Figures 1-5, we see that
HCM and HCM* also perform well for other types of percolation processes and an SIR epidemic.
These results reveal and confirm the key role of the mesoscopic community structure in percola-
tion processes. Furthermore, the fact that the predictions of HCM and HCM* are both close to
the behavior of the original network under percolation indicates that the shapes of the communi-
ties only have minor influence on the percolation process. The surprising finding that the exact
internal community structure barely influences the epidemic processes may be explained by the
denseness of the communities. Table 1 shows that the communities are very dense compared to
the entire network. Since community detection algorithms look for dense subsets in large complex
networks, applying HCM or HCM* to real-world networks typically yields sets of dense communi-
ties. The Autonomous Systems network has communities that are much less dense than in most
other networks [45], but even in that network the communities are much denser than the entire
network. Therefore, in the case of bond percolation for example, the communities of mesoscopic
size are supercritical, and the communities will be almost connected after percolation. Thus, an
epidemic entering a community of mesoscopic size will reach most other community members. It
is more difficult for the epidemic to reach other communities, which makes the inter-community
edges the important factor for the spread of an epidemic. When generating a HCM* network, the
communities stay of the same denseness, and therefore it is still relatively easy for the epidemic
to spread inside the communities, regardless of their exact shapes.
The only process where HCM and HCM* are not always close to the process on the original
graph, is a targeted attack (Supplementary Figure 2), even though both models still outperform
CM. Furthermore, some networks show a difference between the predictions of HCM and HCM*.
Therefore, the exact community structures may have some influence on a targeted attack on a real-
world network. Another interesting observation is that where most networks are highly sensitive to
a targeted attack, the Facebook network has a community structure that makes it more resistant
against a targeted attack than a configuration model. This particular feature of the Facebook
network can be explained by the fact that in the Facebook network, most vertices of high degree
are in the same community. Therefore, deleting high degree vertices has a smaller effect than in
a corresponding CM model.
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Figure 2: HCM, HCM* and CM under bond percolation compared to real-world net-
works. a) Autonomous Systems network b) Enron email network c) Collaboration network in
High energy physics d) PGP network e) Facebook friendship network f) yeast network. Inde-
pendently, each edge is deleted with probability 1 − p. The size of the largest component after
deleting the edges is the average of 500 generated graphs.
The results of the yeast network show that in some situations CM performs equally well as HCM
or HCM*. Thus, in some cases the mesoscopic properties of a network do not influence percolation
processes. In the case of the yeast network, this can be explained by its almost tree-like structure;
there is no noticeable community structure. Thus, by adding the community structure in HCM or
HCM*, no structural information is added. This suggests that CM, HCM and HCM* combined
can also show whether the community structure given by a community detection algorithm is
meaningful. When the behavior of various processes on CM, HCM and HCM* are similar, this
may imply that there is no real community structure in the network.
The Enron, High Energy Physics and PGP networks have communities that inhibit percola-
tion or an SIR epidemic compared to a configuration model with the same degree distribution.
This is similar to the observation that communities can act as traps for an epidemic process
across a network [46]. In contrast, the communities in the Autonomous Systems graph enforce the
percolation process, which may be attributed to its star-like community structure. Since HCM*
preserves the degrees of the vertices inside their own community, HCM* creates a graph that
captures this star-like structure. An important conclusion is that these findings confirm that both
HCM and HCM* are realistic models for real-world networks.
Where [47] creates a reshuffling of a given network using several microscopic properties of
every vertex, HCM and HCM* use mesoscopic properties instead. An advantage of using HCM
or HCM* is that both models are easy to generate. Since HCM* is more random than HCM, it
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data HCM HCM* CM
AS 0.30 0.16 0.20 0.09
Enron 0.50 0.35 0.22 0.03
HEP 0.47 0.40 0.24 0.00
PGP 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.00
FB 0.22 0.15 0.08 0.00
yeast 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.01
Table 3: Average clustering for the original data set, HCM, HCM* and CM. The presented values
are averages of 100 generated graphs.
is a better choice for generating a random network. Note that in HCM*, the rewiring of intra-
community edges makes the community structure a uniform simple graph with the prescribed
degrees. Specifically, if the interest is to generate a random graph such that percolation on that
graph behaves in a similar way as in the original network, then our results show that HCM* is
a suitable choice. However, HCM* does not capture the microscopic properties of the original
network as effectively as HCM. HCM*, for example, does not generate networks with similar
clustering as in the original network [36]. Therefore, when the goal is to create a network with
similar clustering as the original network, using HCM* may be less suitable. Indeed Table 3 shows
that in most cases HCM generates a network with a clustering coefficient that is closer to the
value of the original network. An exception is the Autonomous Systems network, where HCM*
is closer to the real value of the clustering. An explanation for this is that the communities in
the Autonomous Systems network have virtually no clustering; all clustering is between different
communities. HCM also has no clustering inside the communities, but the pairing between different
communities destroys the clustering between different communities, and therefore HCM creates a
network with a lower clustering coefficient. HCM* also destroys the clustering between different
communities, but by rewiring the edges inside communities, creates some clustering inside the
communities. Therefore, the value of the clustering of HCM* is closer to the value of the original
network than the one of HCM.
The fact that HCM* does not capture the clustering coefficient and the assortativity (See
Supplementary Notes 3.1) well, but does capture the spread of an epidemic across a network,
again confirms that the mesoscopic properties are of vital importance for the spread of an epidemic
across a network. Even though microscopic features such as clustering are destroyed in HCM*, the
mesoscopic properties are sufficient to know how an epidemic spreads, making HCM* a suitable
random graph model when considering the mesoscopic structure of networks.
Conclusion
Community structures in real-world networks have a profound impact on percolation or epidemic
spreading, which is central to our understanding of dynamical processes in complex networks. The
theoretical analysis of epidemic spreading in heterogeneous networks with community structure
requires the development of novel analytical frameworks. We have introduced the hierarchical
configuration model (HCM) to describe such networks. Both HCM and its randomized counterpart
HCM* turn out be highly suitable to capture epidemic spreading on real-world networks. We have
shown this by mapping the models to various real-world networks, and by investigating a range
of epidemic processes including bond percolation, bootstrap percolation and an SIR epidemic.
Our experiments show that while it is essential to take the community structure into account,
the precise internal structure of communities is far less important for describing an epidemic
outbreak. This insensitivity is likely due to the relative denseness of the communities. When
communities are sparse, their internal structures are expected to have a more decisive effect on
epidemic spreading. The HCM and HCM* models can easily be extended to include overlapping
communities, by considering an auxiliary graph. It would be interesting to see whether including
6
overlapping communities further improves the description of percolation across complex networks.
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Supplementary Notes
Supplementary Note 1 Network properties
Tables 1, 2 and 3 give several statistics of the networks that we have considered. We now explain
these characteristics in more detail.
1.1 Graphs
A graph G = (V,E) consists of a set of vertices V , and a set of edges E. In this paper, all graphs
are undirected. The edge set E consists of pairs of vertices that are linked to one another, so that
if {v1, v2} ∈ E, then v1 and v2 have an edge between them. The degree of vertex i is denoted by
di, and represents the number of edges that are adjacent to vertex i. Let N denote the number of
vertices in the graph, and Nk the number of vertices in the graph of degree k. Then the degree
distribution of the graph is given by pk = Nk/N , for k = 0, 1, . . . .
1.2 Clustering
The clustering coefficient Ci of a vertex i is defined as the number of triangles that i is part of,
Ti, divided by the number of pairs of neighbors of vertex i, so that
Ci =
2Ti
di(di − 1) . (1)
This can be interpreted as the fraction of neighbors of v that are also neighbors of one another.
Given the degree di of vertex i, the number of pairs of neighbors of i equals di(di−1)/2. Then the
average clustering coefficient C is defined as the average of the clustering coefficient of all vertices,
C =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ci. (2)
1.3 Modularity
The modularity of a network is a measure of how well the network can be divided into communities.
Consider a partition P of the N vertices into communities. The modularity M(P ) of a partition
P equals [48]
M(P ) =
∑
c∈P
Lc
L
−
(
dc
2L
)2
, (3)
where L is the number of edges of the network, Lc is the number of edges inside community c, and
dc is the sum of all degrees of vertices in community c. This is a measure of how many edges are
inside the community, minus how many edges would be expected if the vertices were connected at
random. Therefore, a higher modularity implies many edges inside communities.
1.4 Assortativity
The assortativity of a graph G = (V,E) can be interpreted as the correlation between the degrees
at the end of a randomly chosen edge [49] and is given by
r(G) =
2
∑
{i,j}∈E didj − 12L
(∑
i d
2
i
)2∑
i d
3
i − 12L (
∑
i d
2
i )
2 . (4)
Positive assortativity indicates that vertices of high degree are connected to other vertices of high
degree, and negative assortativity indicates that high degree vertices are typically connected to
vertices of low degree. Assortativity is a frequently used network statistic, despite its dependence
on the network size [50].
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1.5 Size of giant component
A network may consist of several connected components, C1,C2, . . . ,Ck. The proportion of vertices
in the giant component S is then defined as the fraction of vertices in the largest connected
component: S = |Cmax|/N , where Cmax is the largest connected component in the network, i.e.,
|Cmax| = maxi |Ci|, where |C | denotes the size of cluster C . If the maximal component is not
unique, we break ties in an arbitrary way.
1.6 Graph distances
The graph distance between two vertices u and v is defined as the minimal number of edges in a
path that links u and v. Supplementary Figure 7 presents the graph distances for the different data
sets. In some instances, HCM and HCM* capture the graph distances better than CM. However,
for example for the yeast network, the distances in CM are already close to the distances in the
original data set.
Supplementary Note 2 Community detection
The HCM and HCM* models use as input the community structure of a network. Several al-
gorithms to detect this community structure are available. In this paper, we used the Infomap
community detection algorithm [44]. This community detection algorithm uses a random walk
perspective to detect the communities. It has a computational complexity of O(N log(N)) for a
network of N vertices, making it applicable to detect community structures in large networks.
Furthermore, the algorithm performs well on several benchmarks compared to other community
detection methods [51].
Supplementary Note 3 HCM and HCM*
Given a real-world network and the collection of its communities, obtained e.g., using a community
detection algorithm, we construct HCM and HCM* in the following way. First, rewire the edges
between different communities, using the switching algorithm. Select two inter-community edges
uniformly at random, {u, v} and {w, x}. Now delete these edges and replace them by {u, x},
{w, v} if this results in a simple graph. Otherwise keep the original edges {u, v} and {w, x}. This
randomizes the inter-community edges uniformly if this procedure is repeated at least 100E times,
where E is the number of inter-community edges [52]. This creates HCM.
To create HCM*, the edges within the communities are also randomized after rewiring the
inter-community edges, again using the switching algorithm. This is repeated for all communities.
Now we analyze HCM in more detail, to analytically derive the size of its largest component
as in [34]. Let si be the size of community i, and ki the number of half-edges from community
i to other communities. We call ki the inter-community degree of community i. We define the
joint distribution pk,s to be the fraction of communities of size s with inter-community degree k.
We define two distributions and their probability generating functions to calculate the size of the
largest component. The excess inter-community degree distribution
qk,s =
(k + 1)pk+1,s
〈k〉 , (5)
can be interpreted as the probability to arrive in a community with inter-community degree k
and size s when traversing a random inter-community edge, excluding the traversed edge. Here
〈k〉 = ∑k,s kpk,s is the expected value of k. Similarly, define
rk,s =
spk,s
〈s〉 (6)
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as the probability that a randomly chosen vertex is in a community of size s (including the
vertex itself) and has k edges to other communities. The probability generating functions of these
distributions are given by
gq(x) =
∑
k,s
qk,sx
k =
1
〈k〉
∑
k,s
kpk,sx
k−1, (7)
gr(x) =
∑
k,s
rk,sx
k =
1
〈s〉
∑
k,s
spk,sx
k, (8)
and are used to calculate the asymptotic size of the largest component.
Let u be the probability that a community that is reached by traversing a random inter-
community edge is not in the giant component, in which case all the communities connected
to it cannot be in the giant component either. The k neighboring communities of the reached
community are not in the giant component with probability uk. Hence, a community is not in the
giant component with probability
u =
∑
k,s
qk,su
k = gq(u). (9)
The probability that a randomly chosen vertex is not in the giant component is
∑
k,s rk,su
k =
gr(u). Thus, the proportion of vertices in the largest component S satisfies
S = 1− gr(u). (10)
Equations (9)-(10) can be solved together to find the asymptotic size of the largest component.
Equations (9)-(10) only depend on the community sizes and the number of edges to other
communities. Therefore, when the communities of HCM* are connected, they give the size of
the largest component both for HCM and HCM*. In most instances, the number of edges from
one vertex of the community to other vertices of the community is large, so HCM* typically
generates connected communities, and indeed (10) can also be used to calculate the size of the
giant component in HCM*.
3.1 Assortativity of HCM
The assortativity of the HCM can be computed analytically using (4). We denote the degree of a
randomly chosen vertex among the N vertices of the graph by DN . Then, (4) can be rewritten as
r(G) =
2
∑
{i,j}∈E didj − 12L
(∑
i d
2
i
)2∑
i d
3
i − 12L (
∑
i d
2
i )
2 =
2
N
∑
{i,j}∈E didj − (
1
N
∑
i d
2
i )
2
1
N
∑
i di
1
N
∑
i d
3
i − (
1
N
∑
i d
2
i )
2
1
N
∑
i di
=
2
N
∑
{i,j}∈E didj − E[D
2
N ]
2
E[DN ]
E[D3N ]− E[D
2
N ]
2
E[DN ]
. (11)
Therefore, the only term of assortativity that depends on the community structure of HCM is the
first term in the numerator. The edges of HCM can be split into two sets: the edges that are
entirely inside a community, and the edges that are between two different communities, denoted
by Ec and Eb respectively. The edges inside communities are fixed given the community shape.
Let the n communities of the network be denoted by {H1, . . . ,Hn}. For a given community H,
let Q(H) denote
Q(H) =
∑
{i,j}∈EH
didj . (12)
Then the contribution of the intra-community edges to the first term in the numerator can be
written as
12
E
[ 1
N
∑
{i,j}∈Ec
didj
]
=
1
N
n∑
k=1
∑
{i,j}∈EHk
didj =
1
nE[Sn]
n∑
k=1
Q(Hk) =
E[Qn]
E[Sn]
, (13)
where E[Qn] is the expected value of Q of a randomly chosen community, and E[Sn] the size of
a uniformly chosen community. Let D(b)N denote the number of edges to other communities of a
randomly chosen vertex, and L(b) the total number of edges between communities. The probability
that a specific half-edge will be paired with another specific half-edge equals 1/(2L(b) − 1), since
the half-edges are paired at random. We denote the number of half-edges adjacent to vertex i by
d(b)i . Then the contribution of the inter-community edges can be written as
E
[ 1
N
∑
{i,j}∈Eb
didj
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
d
(b)
i∑
k=1
d
(b)
j∑
l=1
didj
2L(b) − 1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
did
(b)
i djd
(b)
j
2L(b) − 1
≈ 1
N2L(b)
(
N∑
i=1
did
(b)
i
)2
=
1
2L(b)/N
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
did
(b)
i
)2
=
E[DND(b)N ]2
E[D(b)N ]
. (14)
Combining (11), (13) and (14) gives for the expected assortativity of a HCM network that
E[r(G)] =
2
E[DND(b)N ]
2
E[D(b)N ]
+ 2E[Qn]E[Sn] −
E[D2N ]2
E[DN ]
E[D3N ]− E[D
2
N ]
2
E[DN ]
. (15)
Supplementary Table 1 shows that HCM and HCM* generate networks that match the as-
sortativity of the original network closer than a configuration model. However, the assortativity
generated by HCM does not always match its theoretical value. An explanation for this is that
HCM generates simple graphs, while the theoretical estimate does not take this into account. Since
both ends of a self-loop have the same degree, having non-simple graphs increases the assortativity.
Furthermore, these self-loops typically occur at nodes of large degree, increasing the assortativity
even further, so that the theoretical assortativity is higher than the observed assortativity.
3.2 Overlap of HCM and original communities
By keeping the sets of communities fixed, we expect both HCM and HCM* to generate networks
with a similar community structure as the original data set. To test how similar the community
structures of the generated networks and the original networks are, we define the similarity wHCM
of the two community structures as
wHCM =
1
N
∑
i
|Ci ∩ CHCMi |
|Ci| , (16)
where Ci and CHCMi are the sets of vertices that are in the same community as vertex i in the
original network, and the HCM network respectively. We define the similarity for the community
structure generated by HCM* similarly as wHCM*. Table 3 presents this similarity measure for all
networks. We see that for most networks, the degree of overlap is large, but for the AS network,
the overlap between the original network community sets and the networks generated by HCM
or HCM* is smaller. This may be explained by the fact that the AS network has less dense
communities, so that rewiring the edges between communities can easily shift vertices from one
community to the other.
3.3 Connectedness of HCM* communities
The communities of HCM* are generated by rewiring the edges of the original communities. This
may cause the communities to be disconnected after rewiring. Table 3 presents the fraction of dis-
connected communities fdis that HCM* generates. Table 3 also presents Ndis, the average number
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of vertices that are not connected to the largest component of the community after rewiring, given
that the community is disconnected. We see that the fraction of disconnected communities is
different for the different networks. For the networks with a more dense community structure, the
probability that a community becomes disconnected after rewiring is low, while for for example the
AS network this probability is higher. In all cases, the number of vertices that are disconnected
from the largest component is low, indicating that the community stays largely connected.
Supplementary Note 4 Types of epidemic processes
In Figure 2 and Supplementary Figures 1- 5, the results of several epidemic processes are plotted.
Here we describe these processes in more detail.
4.1 Bond percolation
In bond percolation, every edge of the network is deleted independently with probability 1 − p.
The quantity of interest is the fraction of vertices that are in the largest component after this
deletion process.
4.2 Site percolation
In site percolation, every vertex, and all edges adjacent to it, are deleted with probability 1 − p,
independently for every vertex. As in bond percolation, we are interested in the fraction of vertices
in the largest component after this deletion process.
4.3 Targeted attack
In a targeted attack, a fraction of p of the vertices and the edges adjacent to them are removed,
starting with the highest degree vertex, then the second highest degree vertex and so on. Again,
the quantity of interest is the fraction of vertices in the giant component after deleting the edges.
4.4 Bootstrap percolation
In bootstrap percolation with threshold t initially a certain fraction of vertices is infective. The
initially infected vertices are selected at random. Then, every vertex with at least t infected
neighbors also becomes infected. This process continues until no new vertices become infected
anymore. In the results, we consider bootstrap percolation with threshold t = 2. The quantity of
interest is the fraction of infected vertices when the process has stopped.
4.5 SIR epidemic
In an SIR epidemic, vertices are either susceptible, infected or recovered. One vertex is selected
uniformly at random to be the initial infective. Then, every infected vertex infects his susceptible
neighbors independently at rate β. Every infected vertex recovers at rate γ. As in [26], we set
γ = 1 and β = 3 〈d〉 /γ, where 〈d〉 is the average degree of the network. We are interested in how
the fraction of infected and recovered vertices evolves over time. Note that since every vertex is
either susceptible, infected or recovered, the fraction of susceptible vertices is then also known.
Supplementary Discussion
Supplementary Table 2 shows the fraction of edges of the data sets that are inside communities.
HCM fixes all these edges, so one could argue that HCM overfits the data by keeping this fraction of
edges fixed. For this reason, we also consider HCM*. Supplementary Figure 6 shows the fraction of
rewired edges in HCM* in communities of size s. This is the fraction of edges that are different from
14
the edges in the original community after the rewiring procedure inside communities. In general,
a large fraction of edges is different after randomizing the intra-community edges. The cases
where only a few edges were rewired correspond to small communities, where only a small amount
of simple random graphs with the same degree distribution exist, or larger communities that
are complete graphs, or star-shaped (where only one simple graph with that degree distribution
exists). This shows that HCM* creates substantially different graphs than HCM, and is less prone
to overfitting the data than HCM.
Supplementary Tables
data HCM HCM* CM HCM (theory)
AS -0.19 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 0.00
Enron -0.11 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02
HEP 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.00 0.25
PGP 0.24 0.26 0.26 -0.01 0.26
FB 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.11
yeast -0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Supplementary Table 1: Assortativity of HCM, HCM* and CM compared to the real network and
theoretical HCM value. The theoretical value is derived in Supplementary Note 3.1. The values
of HCM, HCM* and CM are averages over 500 generated graphs.
AS Enron Hep PGP FB yeast
0.58 0.58 0.70 0.83 0.54 0.52
Supplementary Table 2: The fraction of edges inside communities in the data sets.
fdis Ndis wHCM wHCM*
AS 0.24 3.00 0.68 0.65
Enron 0.02 3.62 0.94 0.92
HEP 0.04 2.23 0.96 0.94
PGP 0.17 2.54 0.97 0.91
FB 0.17 2.61 0.93 0.92
yeast 0.11 2.29 0.85 0.81
Supplementary Table 3: Connectedness of HCM* communities and overlap of community structure
of generated networks and original networks as defined in (16).
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Supplementary Figure 1: HCM, HCM* and CM under bootstrap percolation compared
to real-world networks. a) Autonomous Systems network b) Enron email network c) Collabo-
ration network in High energy physics d) PGP network e) Facebook friendship network f) yeast
network. Initially, a certain fraction of the vertices is infected at random. Then, a vertex becomes
infected when at least 2 of its neighbors are infected. The final fraction of infected vertices is the
average of 500 generated graphs.
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Supplementary Figure 2: HCM, HCM* and CM under a targeted attack, compared to
real-world networks. a) Autonomous Systems network b) Enron email network c) Collabora-
tion network in High energy physics d) PGP network e) Facebook friendship network f) yeast
network. The fraction of 1 − p vertices of highest degree are removed. The size of the largest
component after the vertices are removed is the average of 500 generated graphs.
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Supplementary Figure 3: HCM, HCM* and CM under site percolation compared to real-
world networks. a) Autonomous Systems network b) Enron email network c) Collaboration
network in High energy physics d) PGP network e) Facebook friendship network f) yeast network.
Independently, every vertex is removed from the network with probability 1 − p. The size of the
largest component after the vertices are removed is the average of 500 generated graphs.
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Supplementary Figure 4: The number of infected individuals in an SIR epidemic in
HCM, HCM* and CM compared to real-world networks. a) Autonomous Systems network
b) Enron email network c) Collaboration network in High energy physics d) PGP network e)
Facebook friendship network f) yeast network. The presented results are the average of 500
generated graphs, with recovery rate γ = 1 and infection rate β = 3 〈d〉 /γ, where 〈d〉 is the mean
degree.
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Supplementary Figure 5: The number of recovered individuals in an SIR epidemic in
HCM, HCM* and CM compared to real-world networks. a) Autonomous Systems network
b) Enron email network c) Collaboration network in High energy physics d) PGP network e)
Facebook friendship network f) yeast network. The presented results are the average of 500
generated graphs, with the recovery rate γ = 1 and the infection rate β = 3 〈d〉 /γ, where 〈d〉 is
the mean degree.
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Supplementary Figure 6: The fraction of rewired edges inside communities for HCM*. a)
Autonomous Systems network b) Enron email network c) Collaboration network in High energy
physics d) PGP network e) Facebook friendship network f) yeast network. Every dot corresponds
to a community. The fraction of rewired edges is the fraction of edges in the community that are
present after randomizing the intra-community edges, but were not present before randomizing.
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Supplementary Figure 7: Distances in the original network, HCM, HCM* and CM.
a) Autonomous Systems network b) Enron email network c) Collaboration network in High
energy physics d) PGP network e) Facebook friendship network f) yeast network. Distances
are approximated by sampling 5,000 nodes from the graphs, and calculating all distances between
pairs of nodes in the sampled set. The values for HCM, HCM* and CM are the average over 100
generated graphs.
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